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This Conference is focused on the role that innovation and technology
will have in a rapidly changing world - a world in which national
trade barriers are either dropping or collapsing after being attacked; a
world in which tomorrow's technology, if not exploited today, is no
longer of value; a world in which individual corporations are dedicating
annually financial resources to research and development in amounts
which a decade ago might well have exceeded their annual gross reve-
nues. In essence, it is a time of change and a time of challenge, but also a
time of opportunity.
While this Paper is sub-titled "A Canadian Perspective," I do not
mean to suggest that the Canadian perspective is different from the U.S.
perspective, the EEC perspective or even the Japanese perspective. I be-
lieve that all corporations enjoying, or merely seeking, world markets
will have more in common than they lack.
My business perspective has been formed in recent years in the dis-
charge of my responsibilities at Northern Telecom Limited. Northern
Telecom is a Canadian-headquartered, publicly-traded designer, manu-
facturer and marketer of a full line of telecommunications equipment
ranging from telephone wire and cable to sophisticated central office
switching systems and data packet networks.
With 1988 revenues of U.S. $5.4 billion and research and develop-
ment expenditures exceeding U.S. $700 million, Northern Telecom has
manufacturing facilities throughout the world and markets its products
in approximately eighty to ninety countries. We are, therefore, vitally
interested in exploiting our technology on a world-wide basis, but be-
cause our commercial activities are in the telecommunications area and
because most countries outside of North America have telecommunica-
tions services provided by a government department, the challenges that
we have had to address extend beyond those of most commercial enter-
prises. In order to exploit that technology in offshore markets, certain of
our traditional expectations as to how we would like to carry on business
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have had to be discarded and we have had to be innovative in the ways
we address the exploitation of technology.
II. A DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENT
Offshore markets, by definition, differ in form and substance from
North American markets. There are those who say, accurately, that
North American markets, while having many similarities, also have
many variations - particularly when one remembers that the proper def-
inition of North America includes Mexico. In seeking to exploit innova-
tion offshore, one has to bear in mind that foreigners often have different
perspectives and objectives than our own. Their cultures are different in
varying degrees. After all, even the English take the lift, lift the bonnet
and store the bonnets in the boot. Even though many North Americans
trace their roots directly to "this sceptred isle," some adjustment is still
necessary.
Obviously, when one addresses cultures that are even more foreign,
the need for adjustment is that much greater. The rules we have nor-
mally followed in domestic markets have to be revised - sometimes "on
the run." One has to adapt rapidly to succeed. Americans often have
greater difficulty in adapting than Canadians - largely, I believe, be-
cause of their higher level of self-sufficiency and their more unified
culture.
There are those objectives which are universal and which are to be
found wherever negotiations take place and without regard to who is ne-
gotiating. But there are other objectives which are special to a country or
a region, such as a national need to develop the economy in a certain
manner, or to enhance a certain region or race within the country, or
sometimes just a need to "save face" - for example a reluctance to con-
cede dependence on a foreign technology.
What one has to be conscious of in such negotiations is what one
author has termed the "self-reference criteria ... the tendency to subcon-
sciously refer to one's own cultural values in anticipating the response of
another." One has to refrain from placing too much emphasis on apply-
ing one's own standards and criteria to the transaction, but has to view,
as best as one can, the transaction from the perspective of the other side,
so as to accommodate their reasonable needs. Innovation, in other
words, must be exlloited in different markets with regard for different
perspectives and needs, otherwise the likelihood of success is substan-
tially reduced.
III. THE DIFFERENT WAYS
When one has achieved a certain level of success and comfort in the
domestic market and has, perhaps, reached a level where the market is
generally satisfied, there is a natural tendency to want to expand one's
Vol. 15:191 1989
2
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 15 [1989], Iss. , Art. 29
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol15/iss/29
Allen-EXPLOITING CANADIAN TECHNOLOGY
horizons and to exploit the technology or products elsewhere. This ex-
ploitation can take one of the following forms:
1) The export of products manufactured in a domestic operation to
other countries either directly or through a subsidiary, branch op-
eration or third party serving as a distributor or with a third party
assisting as an agent or representative;
2) The establishment of a production facility in a foreign country and
the sale of the production of that facility in that country, and per-
haps in other countries forming part of a logical market;
3) The establishment of a joint venture in a foreign country to manu-
facture in that country - in effect a partnership with one or more
other partners (usually local), carrying on the activities of manu-
facturing and selling the products arising from the technology;
and
4) The licensing of technology to a non-affiliated enterprise in a for-
eign country which permits that enterprise to manufacture the
product in whole or in part and to sell in a defined market.
IV. THE NORTHERN TELECOM EXPERIENCE
Northern Telecom was driven to exploit its technology beyond its
Canadian boundaries during the 1960s, when it realized the costs of de-
veloping technology in a rapidly evolving industry could exceed the costs
it could support while remaining economically viable. Since its inception
in the 1880s, Northern Telecom had had a close association with the
telecommunications equipment manufacturing subsidiary of American
Telephone & Telegraph, then known as Western Electric. Western Elec-
tric, largely as a result of the 1956 Consent Decree, chose to withdraw
from a variety of activities, among which was its equity participation in
Northern Telecom. As recently as 1956, Western Electric held a 44%
equity interest in what was then known as Northern Electric Company,
Limited. This withdrawal resulted in Northern Telecom having to be-
come self-sufficient in technology development. Since Northern Telecom
revenues at that time were almost entirely derived from Canadian sales
activities, and since there were then, as there are now, fewer telephones
in all of Canada than in the State of California alone, it is easy to see that
the revenue stream, which ultimately funds the research and develop-
ment of any enterprise, had to be extended beyond Canada in order for
the company to have the funds to ensure technology advanced while the
company remained financially secure.
Our first efforts beyond North America included a joint venture
with the Turkish government in the mid-1960s in the suburbs of Istan-
bul, as well as export sales out of Canada to various countries in Europe,
Africa and South America. With the exception of Turkey, our efforts
were only marginally successful. In the early 1970s the international
marketing activities were largely discontinued and we began to focus on
what we considered at that time the prime market opportunity - the
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United States. In that market, from the serious commencement of busi-
ness in the early 1970s, our sales rose from virtually zero to more than
the $3 billion level that we have achieved in each of the last two years.
In the mid-1970s, with our growth in the United States still under-
way, we began to develop non-North American markets while continu-
ing to develop and expand our Turkish joint venture. In a short time we
established a wholly-owned manufacturing facility in Ireland and sales
and marketing operations throughout Europe, the Caribbean, Latin
America and the Far East. Concurrently, we concluded licensing ar-
rangements with a large number of foreign companies that had a substan-
tial market presence, considerable resources, a good reputation in our
industry, and a credibility with the local customers - generally the na-
tional telephone administrations, usually departments of governments.
More recently, as part of our overseas thrust, we established joint ven-
tures in various countries, including China and France. While it will
take some time to achieve the market penetration we have obtained in
North America, we see an increasing acceptance and support of our ac-
tivities in overseas markets.
V. A CLOSER LOOK
I would like to look, in more detail, at the considerations which will
enter into the decision as to how technology is to be exploited in the
offshore market. I should note at the outset that one may start in one
mode and evolve into another mode. What is right at one time or for one
place may be wrong for another time or in another place. Northern
Telecom's experience suggests that flexibility is important. A corpora-
tion should be prepared to develop markets in all of the ways described
above.
The export of products from domestic production is obviously the
easiest route. There is no need for a replication of manufacturing facili-
ties; there is often no need for additional corporate entities; one isn't
obliged to spend a great deal of time and money in developing tax and
other strategies. One need merely appoint a distributor or perhaps send
an employee on an occasional sales visit.
The limited demands that this makes usually result in limited suc-
cess. Customers like to see a supplier demonstrate a commitment to a
market by an investment in the form of facilities, people and products, to
meet the specific needs of that market. Customers like to communicate
directly with people who understand the product line in the context of
the local market and who have direct access to more senior management,
but who function in the same or adjacent time zone. Customers gener-
ally like to deal with the source.
From the supplier's perspective, however, this is a simple, trouble-
free and minimal-investment arrangement and, within the limits it im-
poses there is an opportunity to participate in those markets. Corpora-
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tions which have operations of a certain nature sometimes have no
alternative. Many natural resources companies mine and process their
product in certain parts of the world and sell it to consumers throughout
the world. Certain companies, for example, aircraft manufacturers like
McDonnell Douglas and Boeing, are limited by the nature of their opera-
tions to a small number of facilities. These companies cannot be ex-
pected to have strong and economically viable plants wherever their
markets may be.
Where a company has chosen to export its product, it may find,
particularly when the customer is a government, that it is required to
participate in purchases to compensate for its export sales. These ar-
rangements, which are sometimes called offset, compensation or counter-
trade, are frequently found in the defense industry, but also exist in other
industries where the government, or a governmental agency, is the pur-
chaser. They also exist where foreign exchange requirements necessitate
exports to recover the hard currency expenditures caused by the imports.
The buyer in these instances may want state-of-the-art technology which
is only available from a handful of suppliers - all of them foreign. The
commitment of the buyer may be substantial, but in relation to the over-
all activity of the seller it may be comparatively small. The country may
not be in a position, particularly if it is a sophisticated product, to partici-
pate extensively in the production activity. However, the buyer will
often demand some form of local purchases in order to generate eco-
nomic activity within that country. We have, as a company, experienced
these demands in certain countries, even though we are not in the defense
industry.
As an exporter, one has to assess very clearly whether or not one
can be heavily involved in these re-purchase agreements before acquiesc-
ing to such demands, as one becomes dependent on a foreign supplier for
substantial quantities of parts or components that may, because of their
volume, have to be incorporated into products destined for other mar-
kets. Even when those demands are not for the purchase of parts and
components to form part of the sold product, but are for the purchase of
commodities available in abundance in the offshore market, one has to
consider carefully whether or not one should assume responsibility for
the disposal of substantial quantities of salt, foodstuffs, carpets or
whatever.
I will group together the establishment of a local manufacturing fa-
cility by itself with the establishment of one in conjunction with a local
partner, i.e., a joint venture. The establishment of a wholly-owned man-
ufacturing facility is attractive in that it allows the exporter the clear
right to manage the business and determine its direction. It also elimi-
nates the complaints that might arise where minority shareholders, i.e.,
the other joint venture partners, allege the majority shareholder is mak-
ing decisions detrimental to the minority interest. Sole ownership allows
one to plan the business consistent with the worldwide operations and
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strategy of the parent company. On the other hand, it increases the risk
because it requires all the investment to come from the exporter. Some-
times it creates difficulties with respect to foreign investment approvals
that may be required in the local country. Of course, some jurisdictions
will not allow a wholly-owned foreign investment because of a require-
ment for local investment. It also deprives the offshore activity of the
credibility and insight into the local market that a local equity participa-
tion can provide, often at a level beyond that available from locally hired
employees.
The establishment of a local production facility, whether alone or
with other owners, is the most expensive and hazardous way to enter the
local market. Yet, even though it is potentially higher in risk, it may still
be the best approach. Our joint ventures in Turkey, China and France
are ones that we believe provide substantial advantages to us in the local
markets. While the Chinese and French joint ventures are in the early
stages, the Turkish joint venture is mature and has been very successful.
Our Irish manufacturing facility is wholly-owned and has been able to
function very effectively as an extension of our North American PABX
and telephone set manufacturing activities.
Now I want to consider the last of the four ways of exploiting tech-
nology offshore - licensing. I limit the definition of licensing in this
context to the transfer of intellectual property rights required to develop,
manufacture and market products in a foreign market, whether in the
form of technical information or "know-how," patents or a combination
of these two forms of intellectual property. While each licensor has his
own particular reasons for licensing technology, some of the more impor-
tant or usual reasons are the following:
1) To realize financial returns on technological achievements in mar-
kets not otherwise readily available to the licensor because of mar-
ket entry restrictions, insufficient resources, higher priorities, etc.;
2) To share the costs of substantial research and development ex-
penditures not ordinarily affordable by a single enterprise;
3) To capitalize on the market strengths of another firm when it
dominates or controls a foreign market;
4) To establish as a standard, or to enhance awareness of, a proprie-
tary technology;
5) To weaken the position of a foreign competitor by strengthening,
in a controlled manner, a firm which is itself a competitor of the
licensor's foreign competitor;
6) To provide an alternate source of supply for the product on a con-
trolled basis, particularly in low-wage areas of the world;
7) To develop an association with another firm as a prelude to fur-
ther, and often larger, joint activities; and
8) To permit a licensee to assume the obligations of a licensor in a
certain market, thus facilitating the withdrawal from a market or
a contract by a licensor.
The decision to license has to be made carefully. Indiscriminate li-
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censing can, for the licensor, destroy potential markets for his own prod-
ucts or expose proprietary technology to the whole world. Most
licensors are prepared to negotiate license agreements providing for the
transfer of technology in a manner which enables the licensee to meet the
governmental, legal, economic, political and other requirements of the
licensee in the country or countries for which the license is granted.
Very seldom are the requirements of different licensees, even in the same
country, the same. Licensors have to be prepared to bring a certain
amount of flexibility to the licensing arrangements in order to ensure that
the transaction is an attractive and viable arrangement for both parties.
In terms of risk, one would probably place the licensing risk at somewhat
greater than the export risk, but less than the local manufacture or joint
venture risk. Licensing often allows one to participate in the foreign
markets with a fairly minimal and trouble-free activity which will serve
at a later time to provide credibility in the market for a licensor who may
wish to assume the role of a local manufacturer. We have also found it
an ideal way of combining our technological "smarts" with a local manu-
facturer who lacks the sophisticated technology to produce a comparable
product, but who has a substantial market share and credibility. The
lack of sophisticated technology on the part of the local manufacturer is
not necessarily an indication of any lack of fundamental skill, but more
often an indication of the lack of revenue required to support research
and development, or the lack of foresight to determine accurately the
direction in which technology or consumer demand is moving.
As previously noted, it is not uncommon for a company in an off-
shore market to start with periodic sales visits, then develop into a full-
scale exporter of goods, and ultimately establish a local production facil-
ity alone or in combination with others. The establishment of a local
production facility ordinarily results in a license agreement whereby the
local production facility replicates the most relevant of the parent com-
pany's production facilities.
VI. CONCLUSION
In all of the above activities, one has to be conscious of the fact that
we live in a world of regulation, and while our immediate world at times
seems harsh in this regard, the world outside is often harsher. The rules
are different; the language in which they are expressed is different; the
philosophy underlying the rules is different; and the interpretation and
enforcement is different from that with which we are familiar. That
should not discourage our exploitation of technology wherever it makes
good business sense. It does mean that we should be aware of the tools
that are available, be conscious of the need to be flexible and creative,
and preserve our confidence and optimism, although at times one may
feel the punishment exceeds the rewards.
In this respect one has to be conscious of the substantial restrictions
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that exist with respect to transfers of technology, whether imposed by the
exporting country to limit the strategic technology made available to for-
eign countries, or imposed by the importing country to prevent the local
licensee from being consumed by an ill-advised licensing arrangement or
to prevent the drain of substantial foreign reserves from the country.
Rules also cover the investment by foreigners in certain companies, so
that one's best-laid plans of exploiting technology abroad may be frus-
trated by the inability to make the necessary investments. Many other
hazards lie in the way.
If one looks around the world, one sees it becoming a global market.
One sees it becoming a world in which modem means of communication
and transportation have removed the natural barriers to free trade. One
also sees the formulation of free trade agreements and the establishment
of common markets that transcend traditional national boundaries.
We will have to participate in these world markets or be consumed
by those who do. The United States and Canada, standing together,
sharing a common language, having a common heritage and enjoying
substantial natural resources, should both continue to play a dominant
role in world commerce.
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